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A Damp Squib: Environmental Law from a Human Evolutionary Perspective
Benjamin J. Richardson*

I. THE INSCRUTABLE HUMAN CONDITION
In William Golding’s allegorical novel, Lord of the Flies, a group of English schoolboys stranded
on a deserted island try to govern themselves but regress into savagery.1 Isolated from modern
civilization, the semblance of order and control among the boys soon degenerates and violence
ensues. The novel’s plot still resonates with many readers today as a disturbing parable of the
darker side of human nature. Without the veneer of civilized society and its rules, humankind is
unveiled by Golding as a beast. Similarly, it could be said that the more unsavory side of human
nature is illuminated by our relationship with the nature, and the seeming ineffectiveness of
our laws and institutions to curb the environmental burden of modern civilization.
Despite appearances, environmental law in much of the world is a damp squib—in other words,
it doesn’t work properly and fails to ensure sustainable development. In theory, environmental
law can be a means of serving both our own self‐interest, such as by safeguarding drinkable
water or breathable air, as well as extending enlightened protection to other creatures, such as
conserving endangered species or advancing animal welfare. In practice, the problems
environmental law is meant to resolve have by‐and‐large worsened, despite the increasing
swathe of regulations and international treaties implemented in recent decades.2 One likely
reason is that environmental law‐makers have not been sufficiently attentive to human nature
and the behavioral drivers behind our environmental practices.
Understandings of human nature in Western thought have long been contested. The two most
contrasting views are that people are basically nice if we are not corrupted by “civilization”, or
entirely nasty if we are not tamed by the presence of authority. It is a debate that has most
famously pitted English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588‐1679), arguing for nastiness, against
French thinker Jean‐Jacques Rousseau (1712‐1778), championing niceness.3 Alternatively
refuting any form of innatism, seventeenth‐century philosopher John Locke postulated that the
mind was a blank slate (except for a predisposition to acquire property) out of which life
experience moulds one’s character.4 But each of these views about human nature shared the
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada.

1

WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954).

2

On the evolution of modern environmental law, see Neil Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and
Governance: Shifting Architectures, 21(2) J. ENVTL L. 179 (2009). Some states have even gone so far as to
enshrine environmental principles and duties in their national constitutions, elevating environmental law to
a supreme law: Ernst Brandl & Hartwin Bungert, Constitutional Entrenchment of Environmental Protection:
A Comparative Analysis of Experiences Abroad, 16 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 1 (2002).

3

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); JEAN‐JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY (1754).

4

JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690).
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assumption that the individual is the fundamental reference point. As in Lord of the Flies, the
Hobbesian view has tended to be the most influential in Western thought, and it has
profoundly influenced the design of law.
Yet human nature, as revealed by subsequent academic research and personal experience, is
clearly much more nuanced and complex than these stark perspectives. Sometimes we can be
aggressive, selfish, and even self‐delusional. But people can also empathize, cooperate, and
show altruism, which in the opinion of some makes us a “moral animal”5 with the faculty to
consider our impacts on other creatures and to take evasive action. But the relative significance
of our ensemble of lighter and darker instincts, how they are shaped culturally, and their
precise implications for our relationship with the environment, remain highly debatable.
A good vantage point for understanding human nature is its most primitive form. While human
behavior can be analyzed from a wide array of disciplinary perspectives, including behavioral
economics, political science, and social psychology, the evolutionary perspective can offer
deeper insights into the ultimate roots of the human condition. Whereas the field of
evolutionary biology is concerned with understanding the various physiological features of a
whole organism, evolutionary psychology, which is the focus of my article, looks at one special
feature—the human mind, as a collection of evolved psychological adaptations, the contexts
that activate those adaptations, and their behavioral manifestations.6
Our environmental behavior is influenced by what our ancestors have done over thousands or
even millions of years. For ninety‐nine percent of our evolutionary history, people lived in
hunter‐gatherer societies;7 yet human culture and the development of agriculture, as we know
it, is less than 10,000 years old. Our evolutionary heritage creates a number of behavioral
predispositions, some of which under contemporary conditions are environmentally
maladaptive, in the sense that they hinder our ability to recognize the gravity of some of our
environmental threats and how we might avert them. Further, some of those behavioral
predispositions are being reinforced and amplified by culture, which has given us the
technological and institutional means to wreak much greater environmental harm than was
possible as frugal hunter‐gatherers.
We thus remain perched on the precipice of an anthropogenic collapse in planetary ecological
systems that must provoke enquiry about whether humanity itself is sustainable, in

5

RONALD WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL. WHY WE ARE THE WAY WE ARE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (1994).

6

DAVID M. BUSS, EVOLUTIONARY PSCYHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF THE MIND 49‐50 (2004).

7

Frank W. Marlowe, Hunter Gatherers and Human Evolution, 14 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 54 (2005).
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evolutionary terms.8 Our planetary domination is such that some biohistorians label the present
epoch of Earth’s history as the “Anthropocene”.9 While humankind has been altering nature for
millennia,10 since the early twentieth century the range and magnitude of our ecological foot‐
print has grown exponentially. In 2005, the Board of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
warned that “human activity is putting such strain on the natural functions of the Earth that the
ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future generations can no longer be taken for
granted”.11 Species are disappearing between 100 to 1,000 times faster than in pre‐human
times,12 some 40 percent of the planet’s forests of 8,000 years ago have gone,13 and
atmospheric carbon dioxide is at its highest level in some 650,000 years.14 Fuelling these and
many other impacts are soaring human numbers and accompanying economic activity; in the
twentieth century the world’s population grew by a factor of four, from some 1.5 billion to 6
billion, and the global economy enlarged by a factor of 13.15
With emerging economies such as China and India rapidly industrializing, and thereby
intensifying the global environmental burden, grave ecological tipping points may be
irreparably passed soon. The disparate corollaries of these environmental changes and stresses
for humankind will include food shortages, poisoned food chains, dissemination of pathogens,
intense physical damage from storms and other climatic changes, conflicts over water and
other increasingly scarce natural resources, as well as poverty and a widening gulf between the
rich and the poor.16 The likelihood of these problems—which will surely dwarf the impact of the
Great Depression or previous two World Wars—should not surprise us. Indeed, archaeological

8

Charles Fowler & Larry Hobbs, Is Humanity Sustainable? in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF
LONDON, SERIES B: BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 270 (2003).

9

Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen & John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the
Great Forces of Nature, 36(8) AMBIO 614 (2007).

10

E.g., TIMOTHY FLANNERY, THE FUTURE EATERS: AN ECOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALASIAN LANDS
AND PEOPLE (1995) (discussing the historical ecological impacts of indigenous peoples in Oceania).

11

LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS AND HUMAN WELL‐BEING. STATEMENT FROM THE BOARD
5 (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ed., 2005).

12

EXTINCTION RATES 10‐22 (John H. Lawton & Robert M. May eds., 1995); see also Juliet Jowlett, Humans
Driving Extinction Faster Than Species Can Evolve, Say Experts, Guardian (March 7, 2010), available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/ mar/07/extinction‐species‐evolve

13

Anatoly Shvidenko, Charles V. Barber & Reidar Persson, Forests, in ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL‐BEING:
CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS 585, 588 (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ed., 2005).

14

Gary Gardner & Thomas Prugh, Seeding the Sustainable Economy, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2008 4
(Worldwatch Institute ed., 2008).

15

JOHN MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN 360 (2000).

16

See the various impacts and predictions discussed in DAVID MONTGOMERY, DIRT: THE EROSION OF
CIVILIZATIONS (2007); GEORGE MONBIOT, BRING ON THE APOCALYPSE: ESSAYS IN SELF‐DESTRUCTION
(2008); VANDANA SHIVA, WATER WARS, PRIVATIZATION, POLLUTION, AND PROFIT (2002).
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records suggest that civilizations that did not live within environmental constraints suffered
ruin.17
Given what is thus at stake, why is environmental law failing? We should not be misled by its
occasional triumphs, such as the accelerated phasing out of atmospheric ozone‐depleting
chemicals,18 the rescue of iconic species from the brink of extinction,19 or the international
rhetoric about “sustainable development” as environmental law’s guiding objective.20 At most,
we could concede that environmental law has “succeeded” in mitigating what would be a direr
prognosis. Its failure to substantially curb such trends cannot entirely be explained simply as a
result of institutional or political failings, whether owing to ineptly designed regulation,
insufficient resources, or economic disincentives, among prevalent explanations in the
literature.21 Rather, as I will show in this article, environmental law’s limitations stem more
elementarily from unresolved problems in the human condition as a product of the interaction
of biological and cultural evolutionary processes.
While evolutionary science cannot by itself supply a normative direction for environmental law,
a better understanding of human behavior can aid society’s efforts to change behavior.
Although we are seemingly at the pinnacle of our numbers, extent and dominion over nature,
humankind is imbued with unsustainable tendencies which environmental law has yet to
address fully. Environmental law is hampered where it ignores or misunderstands the
behavioral tendencies of the actors it seeks to influence. An evolutionary perspective can
enable us to identify and analyze which behaviors are deeply ingrained and most resistant to
change through regulatory sanctions, economic incentives or other techniques, and which
17

See CHARLES L. REDMAN, HUMAN IMPACT ON ANCIENT ENVIRONMENTS (1999); JARED DIAMOND,
COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 157‐77 (2005); but compare QUESTIONING
COLLAPSE: HUMAN RESILIENCE, ECOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY AND THE AFTERMATH OF EMPIRE (Patricia A.
McAnany & Norman Yoffee eds., 2010).

18

Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989); for an analysis on
why this instrument succeeded, see SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY‐MAKING 221‐52 (2003),

19

A national symbol of the United States, the American Bald Eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) was virtually
extinct when the Endangered Species Preservation Act, 80 Stat. 926; 16 U.S.C. 668aa(c) I) was passed in late
1966. Today, in 2010, all populations except those in the far southwestern United States were transferred
from the endangered to the threatened species list.

20

See Herman E. Daly, Toward Some Operational Principles of Sustainable Development, 2 ECOL. ECON. 1
(1990); MARIE‐CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW:
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS (2005).

21

See e.g., DAVID BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(2003); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for
Market Incentives, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS;
UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001).
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behaviors are more amenable to legal influences. Some improvements to environmental law
will not only depend on a greater understanding of human behavior, but also on rapid cultural
innovations that more conscientiously tap into the kinder and moral side of human nature.
In the rest of this article, I will examine the limitations of environmental law, and its potential
reform, from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. I argue that while the human
condition has some environmentally maladaptive traits, which environmental law has failed to
acknowledge, the nuanced and complex human condition contains an array of cooperative and
altruistic impulses which law‐makers can harness to build successful environmental law. In
other words, we are not trapped by any biologically deterministic path to ruin the environment;
humankind has choices, and can innovate culturally to lessen its environmental burden. Part II
of this article theorizes human nature and focuses on the insights from evolutionary
psychology, and highlights the range of behavioral tendencies of humans. Part III examines
humans’ environmental legacy, and explains how environmental misuse is associated with
several behavioral maladaptions that societies have yet to adequately control. The redesign of
environmental law to make it more behaviorally effective is discussed in Part IV. The focus is on
distillation of several core principles to guide reform. A brief conclusion is provided in Part V, as
well as comments on how we should view our future if we cannot resolve our environmental
challenges.

II. THEORIZING HUMAN NATURE
A. INTRODUCTION
Environmental law is often well informed by the latest scientific knowledge about how
ecosystems function—for example, water protection rules are now commonly based on the
workings of the hydrological cycle, and environmental impact assessment procedures help to
predict the ecological changes posed by developments.22 But commensurate effort has not
been provided by environmental law‐makers in understanding how humans function, even
though such understanding is essential if their regulation is to be behaviorally effective.23
Critiques of environmental law’s record commonly rest on institutional, economic, and political
variables, rather than directly implicating the underlying human behavior. The most
perspicacious views of environmental law tend to come from scholars that have an
interdisciplinary perspective, while drawing on philosophy and anthropology.24
22

Nükhet Yilmaz Turgut, The Influence of Ecology on Environmental Law: Challenges to the Concept of
Traditional Law, 10(2) ENVTL L. REV. 112 (2008); J.B. RUHL, STEVEN KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE
LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2007).

23

Gruter explains that "The effectiveness of law will be proportional to the degree to which the function of a
particular law complements the function of the behavior that the law intends to regulate.” MARGARET
GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 21 (1991).

24

E.g., KLAUS BOSSELMANN, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY: TRANSFORMING LAW AND GOVERNANCE
(2008); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988);
SUSTAINING LIFE ON EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH THROUGH GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
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Much legal theory, including research on environmental law, presumes or constructs notions of
“human nature” that are the subject of regulation or other legal influences. Legal policy‐
makers, however, are often unaware of their dependence on behavioral models and can be
complacent in their assumption that they rely on accurate models. One very influential
paradigm of human nature in the development of modern environmental law is Garrett
Hardin’s parable of the “Tragedy of the Commons”.25 Hardin’s tale of the inevitable
environmental degradation of a common grazing pasture open to all herders is based on a
particular view of human nature as selfish, materialistic, and uncooperative. It is a stance
sometimes associated with the increasingly rebuked neoclassical economics notion of homo
economicus.26 The problem Hardin examined has since been debated extensively through
various analytical lens, including the “prisoner’s dilemma” and coordinating “collective
action”.27 Hardin’s thesis and its intellectual legacy has been unhelpful for its simplistic
assumptions about human nature, in addition to its conceptual confusion about the difference
between an open access resource and one that is managed communally.28
Philosophers have long debated what human nature is, and have often looked to our most
primitive and seemingly unadulterated form for answers. Some mythologize a golden age from
which we have been corrupted by civilization. Moral sentimentalists such as Francis Hutcheson
and David Hume argued that people have natural inclinations to be sympathetic and concerned
for others’ welfare.29 More than any other Enlightenment thinker, Jean‐Jacques Rousseau
concluded that our original state of nature was utopian, born without original sin and having
benevolent impulses.30 According to Rousseau, it is only the trappings of “civilization”, such as
property ownership, monarchical despotism, and religious authority, which have brought
discord and depravity. Alternatively, some believe that civilization has improved the human
character from its supposedly barbaric, primitive beginnings. Voltaire, for instance, believed
that human nature was not fundamentally corrupt: “Man is not born evil; he becomes evil, as

(Colin L. Soskolne, et al. eds., 2008); SEAN COYLE & KAREN MORROW, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND NATURE (2004).
25

Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).

26

Chris Doucouliagos, Note on the Evolution of Homo Economicus, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES 469 (1994). For
criticism, see Herbert Gintis, Beyond Homo Economicus, 35(3) ECOL. ECON. 311 (2000)

27

See e.g,, ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER’S DILEMMA: A STUDY
IN CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1965).

28

MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 232 (1996).

29

See LOUIS SCHNEIDER, THE SCOTTISH MORALISTS ON HUMAN NATURE AND SOCIETY 7‐9 (1967).

30

ROUSSEAU, supra note 3.
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he becomes sick”.31 In this bleaker view of human nature, any “human morality is presented as
just a thin crust underneath of which boil antisocial, amoral and egoistic passions”.32 Thomas
Hobbes saw humankind as naturally selfish, brutal, and nasty, the solution to which, he
believed, was authoritarian government to tame man and avoid a state of perpetual fratricidal
conflict. Hobbes’ somber view of humankind has influenced many subsequent environmental
thinkers, from Thomas Robert Malthus33 to William Ophuls,34 who have raised the specter of
highly authoritarian rule to save a rapidly depleted and overpopulated planet.
None of these opinions about the human condition and human prehistory are entirely accurate.
They fail to acknowledge the nuanced diversity of practices and social conditions around the
world documented by behavioral scientists.35 Evolutionary psychology attempts to integrate a
range of fragmentary human disciplines including anthropology, behavioral economics, political
science, cognitive psychology, and biology into a coherent, broad theoretical framework for
understanding human behavior. It has sought to challenge our understandings of sex, family,
friendship, and other human traits by showing that much behavior is bred in the bone through
evolutionary processes. In its early years, as an academic discipline, evolutionary psychology
was influenced by research on primate ethology.

B. LESSONS FROM PRIMATE ETHOLOGY
Research on primates has influenced theorizing about human social behavior. Because of their
consanguinity with humans, related morphology and cognitive abilities, chimpanzees and
bonobos have been the main referential models for such research.36 About ninety‐eight percent
of the genetic material found in contemporary humans is shared with these primates, a
closeness that led natural historian Jared Diamond to write a book that described people as The
Third Chimpanzee.37 Nonetheless, deducing human behavior from what has been observed in
primates is fraught with methodological difficulties. Scientists remain uncertain as to which
apes model our closest ancestors: the mostly peaceful, egalitarian bonobos, or the more
violent, authoritarian chimpanzees. We also are unclear about the relative importance of
31

FRANÇOIS‐MARIE AROUET, PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY 2: 378 (translated by P. Gay, 1962, original 1764)
(Voltaire was his pen name).

32

SUSAN NEIMAN, MORAL CLARITY 257 (2009) (quoting Frans de Waal). This idea, often known as “veneer
theory”, originated with THOMAS H. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION AND ETHICS (1894).

33

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798).

34

William Ophuls, Leviathan or Oblivion, in TOWARD A STEADY STATE ECONOMY (Herman E. Daly ed., 1973).

35

See RICHARD LEWONTIN, HUMAN DIVERSITY (1995); PHILLIP. TÍTULO, ANTHROPOLOGY. THE EXPLORATION
OF HUMAN DIVERSITY (2004); WILLIAM DURHAM, COEVOLUTION: GENES, CULTURE, AND HUMAN
DIVERSITY (1992).

36

Notably, Craig B. Stanford, The Social Behavior of Chimpanzees and Bonobos: Empirical Evidence and
Shifting Assumptions, 39(4) CURRENT ANTHROP. 399 (1998).

37

JARED DIAMOND, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE: HOW OUR ANIMAL HERITAGE AFFECTS
THE WAY WE LIVE (1991).
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nature and nurture in primates. Anthropologist Melvin Konner concludes, “Few rules about the
social lives of monkeys hold up. One species in different environments can vary almost as much
as different species do. So there are no assurances about what our five‐million‐year‐old
ancestors’ social structure was like”.38
Consequently, theorizing about primate behavior and its applicability to Homo sapiens sapiens
is deeply contested. A traditional theory of primatology is that competition and aggression over
access to food and sexual partners has shaped the understanding of the origins of group‐living
and sociality in both human and non‐human primates.39 In the 1960s many anthropologists on
this basis subscribed to the “killer ape” theory, namely that interpersonal aggression and
warfare has predominantly shaped human evolution.40 In most primate species, however,
cooperative and affiliative interactions, such as grooming, food sharing, cooperative hunting,
and shared vigilance against predators, are also common and may have a more formative
influence on behavioral interactions.41 The evolution of such sociality has been theorized in
terms of neurological feedback systems—specifically that hormonal (oxytocin) mechanisms
may be facilitative of innate cooperative social responses.42
Research on primate ethology has also revealed gender differences in behavior.43 One
fascinating study by Robert Sapolsky and Lisa Share looked at the impact of a demographic
change in a troop of Kenyan baboons.44 A severe outbreak of tuberculosis in the 1980s
decimated the most belligerent and dominant males among the baboons, leading to some
38

MELVIN KONNER, THE TANGLED WEB: BIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE HUMAN SPIRIT (2nd. ed., 2003).

39

See Robert S.O. Harding, Three Decades of Anthropological Primatology, 18 REVS. IN ANTHROP. 235 (1991).

40

See Raymond Dart, The Predatory Transition from Ape to Man, 1 INTER’L ANTHROP. & LINGUISTIC REV. 201
(1953); ROBERT ARDREY, AFRICAN GENESIS: A PERSONAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE ANIMAL ORIGINS AND
NATURE OF MAN (1961). “Civilization” has supposedly served to restrain such tendencies, but whose frailty
is exemplified in Golding’s Lord of the Flies, supra note 1.

41

Robert W. Sussman & Paul A. Garber, Cooperation and Competition in Primate Social Interactions, in
PRIMATES IN PERSPECTIVE 636 (Christina J. Campbell, et al. eds., 2006). While cooperation has been
observed in chimps (see Alicia P. Melis, Brian Hare & Michael Tomasello, Chimpanzees Coordinate in a
Negotiation Game, 30(6) EVOLUTION & HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 281 (2009)), it is most strongly associated with
gorillas (see ALEXANDER H. HARCOURT & KELLY J. STEWART, GORILLA SOCIETY: CONFLICT, COMPROMISE
AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SEXES (2007)).

42

MEG M. OLMERT, MADE FOR EACH OTHER: THE BIOLOGY OF THE HUMAN‐ANIMAL BOND xiii‐xvi (2009)

43

There is also a vast strand of research on people that highlight gender differences in our propensities to
cooperate or conflict. “Ecofeminists” such as Val Plumwood argue that feminist analysis can help to
illuminate ways to behave more kindly to nature: VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF
NATURE (1993).

44

Robert M. Sapolsky & Lisa J. Share, A Pacific Culture among Wild Baboons: Its Emergence and Transmission,
2(4) PLOS. BIOL. E 106 (2004).
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profound social and behavioral transformations in the survivors. They comprised a few
relatively docile males, as well as all the females and juveniles. These baboons became much
more peaceful and communal than the former troop, and astonishingly retained their genial
ethos over many years, even though a new generation of males took over as well as some
outsiders joining the troop. The perpetuation of communal comity suggests that some new
process of acculturation in the group was occurring.
Regardless of these and other insights of primate ethology, many scientists argue that since
chimpanzees (often regarded as our closest relatives) and humans diverged genetically some six
million years ago, each has developed unique social cognitive adaptations.45 For example,
humans are believed to have become more social because “bipedalism necessitated assistance
at birth and alloparenting developed when children needed increasing amounts of care”.46 And,
unlike other primates, humans have developed “the capacity for cumulative cultural
learning”.47 Therefore, in examining our species’ capacity for empathy, altruism, cooperation,
and other traits useful for addressing environmental problems, it is necessary to look primarily
at ourselves for evidence.

C. INSIGHTS FROM EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Like other species, Homo sapiens sapiens is subject to natural selective pressures with regard to
its preferences, emotions, cognition, and values, which serve to enhance opportunities for
individuals’ survival and reproduction.48 Drawing upon the pioneering theory of “socio‐biology”
advanced in the 1970s,49 evolutionary psychologists such as David Buss and Steven Pinker
interpret much human behavior as generated by highly specialized psychological adaptations
that evolved to solve ongoing challenges in humankind’s ancestral environments.50 Thus, just as
for hearts, lungs, and other bodily organs, cognition and emotions have a genetic basis which
has evolved by natural selection, and is universally shared amongst a species. In order to
properly understand the functions of the brain, we must understand the environmental
conditions in which the brain evolved.

45

Johan De Smedt, Helen De Cruz & Johan Braeckman, Why The Human Brain is Not an Enlarged Chimpanzee
Brain, in HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS: EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN MIND AND KIND 168, 169
(Henrik Hogh‐Olesen, Jan Tonnesvang & Preben Bertelsen eds., 2009).

46

De Smedt, De Cruz & Braeckman, supra note 45, at 174.

47

Id., at 175.

48

CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGINS OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION, OR THE
PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR LIFE (1859).

49
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Evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that such environments were the incubator for a range
of inherited emotional and cognitive adaptations, such as the capacity for language, and the
abilities to infer others’ emotions and to discriminate between kin and non‐kin.51 Evolutionary
psychologists see those behaviors and cognition biases that are nearly worldwide and
transcend specific cultures, such as fear of spiders and snakes, as reflective of evolved
adaptations. While natural selection should foster organic designs and behavior that are
functional, in that they enable a creature to become better adapted to its physical
environment, evolutionary psychology has revealed behavior in animals, including humans, that
is nonfunctional and even dysfunctional—which, as is discussed later in this article, can be
especially relevant to understanding some of our harmful environmental practices and
ineffective laws.
Much of humanity's evolutionary roots were in the savannas of East Africa, in hunter‐gatherer
social structures. Humans likely lived in small, highly‐interdependent communities, dominated
by kin and allies,52 but probably in competition with other groups including occasional violent
conflict over territory and access to resources.53 The momentous dispersal worldwide of
anatomically modern Homo sapiens sapiens from Africa occurred about 150,000 years ago,
bringing people into contact with unfamiliar environments that helped trigger behavioral
adaptations. However, it was not until the emergence of stable, benign climatic conditions
during the Holocene that humanity underwent its “Great Leap Forward”.54 The development of
agriculture began about 5,000 BCE, the emergence of writing in the Sumerian culture around
3500 BCE, and the construction of the first towns and cities in Egypt around 3100 BCE.55 No
doubt, formal legal systems also emerged during this period to support economic activities and
the more complex social arrangements.
Evolutionary psychology does not imply biological determinism. There is no one human way to
which we are tied by our evolutionary history. Much of the resistance to the application of
evolutionary theory to understanding contemporary human behavior, explains David Buss,
“stems from the misconception that evolutionary theory implies genetic determinism” and that
human behavior “is impervious to change”.56 In fact, evolutionary models of human behavior
51
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recognize that one’s behavior is a function of the mutual interaction between biological
variation and environmental selection, or, as the issue is often described (sometimes
misleadingly), between nature and nurture. Evolutionary science concedes that culture gives us
the knowledge and tools to alter those environmental inputs to some extent in order to
improve our behavior.57 Human beings are an evolutionary success because we are the most
generalized of animals; we can and have in the past adapted to extraordinarily diverse
circumstances and to rapid change. Biologically, there has been some recent natural selection—
namely in the ethnic varieties of Homo sapiens sapiens, all sprung from our ancestors in Africa.
There have also been physiological adaptations in the shorter term. But, basically, it is culture
that makes us adaptive, and has spawned the variety of human societies of interest to
anthropologists and social historians.58
Evolutionary theory can provide several insights into human social behavior including
environmental practices that may be overlooked by other academic disciplines such as social
psychology, behavioral economics, or political science. One such insight is into the less
proximate bases to our behavior—focusing on the why behind the why. Proximate causes may
seem random or incomprehensible until placed in a larger, evolutionary context. Observable
phenomena may make little sense until we can decipher their ultimate causes. A further
advantage of evolutionary theory is that it can transcend general principles to illuminate their
specific context. For example, general notions that people seek to “maximize economic utility”,
as postulated by behavioral economics, might be too general to understand specific human
behaviors. What matters as an economic benefit varies according to different social contexts,
such as the distinction between how we value relationships with kin and strangers.59
An evolutionary perspective can also help us understand the biological bases to culture. Rather
than seeing human behavior as wholly a product of our social environment, evolutionary theory
reveals that culture has not sprung forth arbitrarily, but, rather, is based on evolved
psychological adaptations in our emotions, beliefs, and behaviors. Local social and ecological
conditions can generate variations, but the broad parameters are set by biological traits. As
Matt Ridley explains, it is not a question of nature versus nurture (i.e., culture), but, rather,
nature via nurture.60
Nonetheless, embracing evolutionary science does not render the findings of traditional social
psychology, behavioral economics, or other disciplines redundant. Indeed, evolutionary
57
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perspectives sometimes cannot elucidate human behavior without heeding the lessons from
other fields of research. They enable us to comprehend human actions in specific social
contexts, thereby helping to “elucidate specific evolutionary hypotheses”.61
For instance, some important insights into our relationships with the natural environment are
provided in the burgeoning field of behavioral economics. It analyses human cognitive and
emotional factors to understand economic decisions by consumers, investors, and other actors,
as well as how they affect prices and allocation of resources.62 Behavioral economics has
advanced more nuanced models of human behavior that reject the neoclassical view that
humans are narrow, cost‐benefit maximizing machines.63 Seminal advances include theories by
Herbert Simon on “bounded rationality”64 and George Ainslie on “inter‐temporal choices”,65
which together show that people make seemingly irrational decisions under the influence of a
range of cognitive biases, and that the way an issue is “framed” to a decision maker will affect
their action.
One illustration of how our “irrational” beliefs can have important consequences for
environmental policy‐making is the phenomenon known as the “endowment effect”. An
assumption of neoclassical rational choice theory is that people will value property logically and
consistently. However, experiments show that people often value something they have just
acquired more highly than they would have been willing to pay for it.66 Endowment effects can
affect the allocation of and trade in property rights in market economies, because property
owners may be unwilling to exchange their rights to others. The result could be an economically
inefficient allocation of property entitlements, such as in a tradable emission allowances
market. Endowment effects are also predicted by evolutionary psychology as a legacy of our
efforts in ancestral environments to protect territorial possessions which required that we
perceive them to be highly valuable.67

61

THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 805 (David M. Buss ed., 2005).

62

See generally Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36(1) J. ECON. LIT. 11 (1998).

63

Oliver Jean Blanchard, Neoclassical Synthesis, in NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (John
Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987).

64

HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, VOLS. 1 & 2. (1982).

65

George Ainslie, Derivation of "Rational" Economic Behavior from Hyperbolic Discount Curves, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 134 (1991).

66

Mathew L. Spitzer & Elizabeth Hoffman, Willingness‐to‐Pay versus Willingness‐to‐Accept: Legal and
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59 (1993)

67

David Friedman, Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, in EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC
THEORY, Vol. 7, 17, 26 (Roger Koppl ed., 2004).

2011]

A Damp Squib

15

D. THE KINDER SIDE OF HUMAN NATURE: THE SOCIAL ANIMAL
Mounting empirical research and new theoretical understandings also reveal that people have
extensive cooperative and altruistic tendencies, and these understandings have important
implications for the design of environmental law.68 Throughout human history we have
increasingly coagulated socially. While the theory of natural selection posits that reproductive
selfishness drives individual behavior, this traditional assumption has had to be modified to
explain observations of seemingly “altruistic” behavior. Altruism can be defined as behavior
directed toward the benefit of others at some cost to the giver. Humans across many cultures
act in seemingly altruistic ways, even helping strangers whom they might never meet again.
Such morality has been theorized as partly a product on an evolutionary heritage we share with
other social mammals, especially for within‐group morality based on kinship, reciprocity and
empathy.69 Marc Hauser in his magnum opus, Moral Minds, argues that our capacity for
morality is innate, like the capacity for language itself, honed by thousands of years of evolution
rather than being a recent cultural construct.70 Dutch biologist Frans de Waal concludes that
people “are moral beings to the core”,71 who like a number of species including primates,
elephants, and dolphins, have deeply evolved capacities to be cooperative and sensitive to
injustice and peace‐loving.72 Humans’ capacity for reason, enabling people to abstractly and
impartiality consider the welfare of others, outside of their group, is considered by ethicist
Peter Singer as an additional basis for morality unlike other social mammals.73 The intellectual
capacity for reasoning can underpin the development of human rights and environmental laws
that provide for protection for interests seemingly remote to an individual’s own interests.
While altruism might make sense when we recognize that human beings evolved for group
living, the puzzle is why should an individual behave cooperatively when it appears costly to
perform but benefits other persons? The various theoretical explanations of altruism include
kinship, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity or reputation, and commitment. In 1964
William Hamilton theorized that altruism serves individual reproductive advantage by passing
68
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along not one's body but one's genes.74 Genetic selfishness, believed Hamilton, could make
room for altruism; for example, by helping close relatives and improving their chances to
reproduce, an individual is still passing on his or her own genes to the next generation, albeit
indirectly. Thus, the extent to which an individual is willing to sacrifice for another should vary
according to his or her degree of consanguinity. In 1971, Robert Trivers suggested that
cooperation could also be favored between nonrelatives, through reciprocal interactions. He
coined the term “reciprocal altruism” to describe helping behavior in the expectation of future
reciprocation—an arrangement that thrives best among individuals with frequent interactions
in stable social networks.75 Cooperative big game hunting and the sharing spoils of the kill was
likely a seminal incubator of such practices.76 As others have since pointed out, such reciprocal
interactions are better described as mutually beneficial arrangements rather than pure
altruism.77 Reciprocal altruism can also be understood as reciprocal obligations, since giving
favors to others “puts the recipient under an obligation to reciprocate”.78 People perceived by
their peers as stingy might compromise their social standing and welfare.
These ideas were elaborated by Richard Alexander’s theory of “indirect reciprocity” to explain
the development of moral systems in human societies, in which our social reputation drives
individuals not only to assist the person to whom they owe something, but also to somebody
else in society.79 Kristen Hawkes argues that the more valuable rewards of reciprocal altruism
are often intangible, involving social recognition for one’s sharing and public‐spiritedness.80 In a
further extension of the altruistic circle, Robert H. Frank has argued that emotions such as love
and trust can predispose people to act against their self‐interest.81 Such emotions can foster
social cooperation; for example, in situations depending on trust; from business deals to
marriage, highly self‐interested people often fare worse than those with an “irrational” loyalty
to abstract ideas of fairness.
Other research has concentrated on the factors that nurtured these cooperative and altruistic
tendencies. Harvard anthropologist, Richard Wrangham, argues that as a consequence of
humans becoming more sedentary over the millennia, including cooking, eating together, and
74
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learning good table etiquette, there have been natural selection pressures for greater within‐
group harmony.82 Sarah Hrdy’s Mothers and Others pinpoints the human practice of
alloparenting83 as our most unique attribute compared to other primates that has fostered
selective pressures that favor individuals who are better at empathizing and thus cooperating
with others.84 Neurology research also shows how our emotional responses to others’ suffering
and intuitive ability to put oneself in another’s shoes provide the natural foundations for
human morality. Scientists have observed how the brain’s mirror neurons respond similarly to
pain in one patient and the observation of pain in another.85 Individuals’ neuroactive hormone
oxytocin levels have been identified as motivating their experience of empathy and trust.86
Perhaps, then, we are creatures so fundamentally social that we do not need the Lockean social
contract to live together.
But while human moral capacity has a deep evolutionary lineage, our genes do not prescribe
any specific moral rules. That is the work of culture, which can mould our natural propensities
into more cooperative and altruistic environmental behavior.87 Cooperative living allowed
humans to indulge in ecological strategies, such as group hunting of large animals, which would
be impossible for solitary creatures.88 Meeting the environmental challenges we face today will
surely require further evolution of cooperative norms. Cooperation within small, closely‐knit
hunter‐gatherer bands is vastly different than addressing the collective action problems of
getting nations around the world to work cooperatively to reduce carbon emissions, protect
forests, and reduce unsustainable marine fishing. Our evolved tendencies to cooperate and be
altruistic are strongest in local settings among closely related peers, and are at their weakest in
larger‐scale contexts involving many unrelated groups. Overcoming this problem of scale will
require evolution of stronger cooperative norms.89
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Whether altruism is driven by genetic selfishness, tit–for‐tat, or other self‐serving motives,
some commentators believe that what is ultimately important is whether it achieves results. As
Matt Ridley illustrates, “If I am setting out to raise money for a charity, I am not going to return
the cheques of companies and celebrities on the grounds that they are motivated more by the
search for good publicity than by the cause itself”.90 A similar debate about the potential trade‐
off between means and ends sometimes arises in modern environmental policy.
Environmentalists once vehemently opposed economic policy instruments such as emission
taxes, on the basis that these were an unethical way to manage pollution. Allowing polluters to
“buy” their right to pollute was viewed as trivializing a problem that required a more coercive
response, such as strict regulatory sanctions to limit emissions.91 But, increasingly,
environmental advocates view green taxes and other economic tools more pragmatically as
useful tools to give market actors incentives to improve their behavior.92 In other words,
environmentalists’ focus has shifted from means to ends, where what matters is not so much
how or why companies or individuals act so long as the desired change occurs expeditiously.
Nonetheless, the foregoing points are certainly not reasons to ignore understanding why
humans may act cooperatively or altruistically; effective policy tools must be designed to
provide the appropriate incentives or reasons to act—what may motivate a person in one
situation may not motivate another. In the case of pollution taxes levied on market actors such
as corporations, the economic incentive can provide a compelling motivation for entities
strongly imbued with a cost‐benefit mentality.
Therefore, human environmental behavior functions within some evolved decision‐making
constraints. One of these constraints is that cooperation is more likely to occur among those
who are close relatives or who previously have reciprocally shared resources. Cooperation is
fostered when people believe in the probability of future reciprocation. People also tend to
undervalue future costs and benefits, perhaps because of the more precarious and shorter lives
humans endured in ancestral environments. This cognitive bias can affect the prospects for
long‐term decision making, such as to address climate change. People also have trouble
understanding notions of probability and risk, depending on the format that risk information is
framed in. But our evolved psychology does not by itself supply any normative guidance on how
we should act towards the environment or what type of environmental laws we should adopt.
What is natural is not necessarily moral. We cannot derive morals from facts, or “ought” from
“is”. But evolutionary theory can help law‐makers by revealing policy conflicts, clarifying causal
links and providing robust explanations for behavioral data lacking coherence.
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The cognitive biases and maladaptions recognized by evolutionary science can be theorized,
explains Owen Jones, a law professor at Vanderbilt University, as a result of “time‐shifted
rationality”.93 In other words, there is a “temporal mismatch between design features of the
brain appropriate for ancestral environments, on one hand, and quite different current
environments, on the other”.94 What a cognitive defect is today was once an evolved
adaptation to different environmental conditions. Thus, in modeling the “law of law’s
leverage”, Jones predicts that: “The magnitude of legal intervention necessary to reduce or to
increase the incidence of any human behavior will correlate positively or negatively,
respectively, with the extent to which a predisposition contributing to that behavior was
adaptive for its bearers, on average, in past environments”.95 Behaviors that can be difficult to
modify include those relating to control of property and territory, resource accumulation, risk
valuation, and certain forms of altruistic behavior. While beliefs and traits deeply embedded in
human evolutionary history are not necessarily impossible to change, they will likely generate
greater resistance to legal influences and thus be more costly to change. Nonetheless, there
may be some situations where behavior can be changed, without great cost, by using tools
historically linked to traditional beliefs and decision rules, such as community shaming to affect
an individual’s status.
Having thus introduced the basic precepts of evolutionary psychology, I will now focus in more
detail on how our evolutionary inheritance has shaped our beliefs and practices with regard to
the natural environment.

III. HUMANS’ ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. OUR ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN IN AN EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT
Environmental law, like other fields of law, is an expression of human culture. Biohistorians
who study the evolutionary path of humankind, view the emergence of culture as not only
humankind’s most significant characteristic as a species, but also the factor that has made us
the planet’s dominant evolutionary force.96 It is not only the capacity to act culturally that
makes humans unique—culture abounds in a number of highly intelligent mammals including
chimpanzees and killer whales97—but also the capacity to accumulate culture and transmit
ideas efficiently across generations.98 Human cultures are the knowledge and associated
93
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behaviors, including language, technologies, arts, economic systems, and political
organizations, that are transmitted socially. One of the most seminal characteristics of cultures
is the behavioral rules we call “law” that govern its members’ interactions with one another
and their environment.
Culture has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it has spawned complex global cities,
stupendous technological innovation and sophisticated legal institutions. On the other hand, it
has also fostered some ideas and practices that are maladaptive, in the sense that they cause
much unnecessary human distress, or undesirable damage to ecosystems, or both. These
cultural maladaptions once included ancient customs such as burning witches at the stake and
the foot‐binding of young girls. Today, we have the misguided invention of weapons of mass
destruction, the rapacious burning of fossil fuels, and the eating of endangered species in the
dubious belief that they possess talismanic, medicinal properties. The persistence and
pervasiveness of these and other cultural practices raises the issue of whether they are
reflective of more deeply embedded characteristics of humankind. Beneath the global mosaic
of diverse customs are some familiar and enduring patterns with regard to human preferences,
emotions, cognition, and values.99
Can we shift to a more socially compassionate and environmentally sustainable path through
further cultural change? Humans evolve culturally much more quickly than they change
genetically. Although people to some extent adjust their behavior as circumstances require, and
can accumulate inherited knowledge, this should not imply that individuals start as a blank
slate, able to be molded culturally in any direction. Yet, many social psychologists (e.g., John B.
Watson),100 sociologists (e.g., Emile Durkheim),101 and anthropologists (e.g., Margaret Mead)102
once thought human behavior was a result of the social environment alone, not by anything
biological. In this vein, it has been concluded, “Humans, then, are tabula rasa―blank
slates―upon which the imprint of their social environments is indelibly printed. [There are]
certain innate drives, such as sex and hunger, but [they are] diffuse in form and few in
number”.103 Such extreme, socially deterministic views of human nature have now conceded to
a growing recognition of the behavioral influence of the cognitive and psychological

99

ALAN S. MILLER & SATOSHI KANAZAWA, WHY BEAUTIFUL PEOPLE HAVE MORE DAUGHTERS 1‐8 (2007).

100

JOHN B. WATSON, BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY (1914).

101

EMILE DURKHEIM, RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 106 (1966) (contending that “Individual natures are
merely the indeterminate material which the social factor determines and transforms”).

102

MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF PRIMITIVE YOUTH FOR
WESTERN CIVILIZATION (1928).

103

ROBERT F. MURPHY, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN OVERTURE 15 (3rd. edn., 1989).

2011]

A Damp Squib

21

characteristics built into the evolved human brain.104 In other words, cultural change occurs
within certain biological parameters.
The biological basis to our behavior may thus help to validate research that suggests that well
before the cultural innovations of the last few millennia humans perpetrated much
environmental harm.105 The evidence, however, is not all one‐sided. Our distant past hints at
humankind’s capacity for environmental sensitivity. William Burroughs surmises that it came
“from watching movements of migratory birds, which are very sensitive to climatic shifts” and
“observing the timing of the different stages of vegetation”.106 This supposed empathy for
animals dates to the hunter‐gatherer stage of human evolution when it was a matter of sheer
survival that people be able to “interpret and anticipate the behavior of animals”.107 Burroughs
cites the vivid depictions of animals in the 15,000 year‐old paintings in the Lascoux caves of
southern France as evidence of our awe and appreciation of nature.108 The transition from
hunter‐gatherer to agricultural lifestyles, which included the domestication of some species to
serve as companions, may have perpetuated aspects of this tendency.109
Incongruously, however, during these same periods humans were also simplifying ecosystems
and eliminating many species, as well as fighting among themselves for control of territory and
natural resources. Archaeological evidence from several Paleolithic sites in North Africa and
Europe has unearthed mass graves in which projectile points are embedded in skeletons and
skulls once splintered by stone axes.110 Concomitantly, there is evidence that large, ungainly
animals and birds in areas unaccustomed to the presence of humans were decimated by the
first hunters. The arrival of the Clovis people in North America some 11,000 years ago and the
Māori in New Zealand 1,000 years ago appears to have led swiftly to the demise of the mega
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fauna, notably the mammoths111 and moas respectively in these lands.112 The new arrivals
might have lacked awareness of the relative scarcity of unfamiliar natural resources and may
not have evolved the requisite social norms quickly enough to limit exploitation of a declining
resource.113
The spread of agriculture wrought even more extensive environmental changes. Vast areas of
Western Europe and Southeast Asia became deforested.114 William Ruddiman attributes the
increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane at 8,000 and 5,000 years ago respectively,
as verified in ice‐core samples, to forest clearance, intensive rice cultivation and other
landscape changes.115 The growth of farming also ushered in the first great urban civilizations in
the Levant and other regions, thereby even more profoundly distancing humankind from the
natural world.116 Eventually, some of these environmental upheavals likely precipitated the
decline or collapse of entire civilizations—such was the fate of the Maya civilization in Central
America.117
In the very distant past, in a world with few people and Stone Age technologies, humankind
could probably act without much concern for ecological constraints. But some behaviors that
were functional in ancestral environments have become irrational and maladaptive today
under different conditions, when we number billions and are equipped with destructive
technologies. Such evolutionary time lags arise because evolution happens slowly, usually over
thousands of generations, so that existing humans remain a legacy of the environments they
111
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inhabited long ago. Evolutionary time lags lead to a phenomenon which Owen Jones describes,
as previously noted, as “time‐shifted rationality”.118
Such mismatches in our psychological adaptation can have serious environmental and social
consequences. One example is our strong taste for fatty foods. Historically our preference for
fat was highly adaptive, because it was a valuable and scarce source of concentrated calories.
But in today’s era of relatively cheap food, fat is available in vast quantities. Our continuing
preference for it has caused us to indulge, and thus incur numerous health problems associated
with obesity.119 Our environmental maladaptions, as examined in the next section, pose even
greater risks to our long‐term well‐being.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIORAL MALADAPTIONS
Most relevant for environmental law‐making, many of the behavioural traits identified by
evolutionary psychologists are manifested around issues of cooperation and conflict. Behavioral
scientists, like political philosophers, have spilt an extraordinary amount of ink debating the
competitive, cooperative, or altruistic impulses of people. It is evident from the titles of
polemics such as Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit,120 Why We Are the Way We Are,121
How Morality Evolved,122 and The Modern Denial of Human Nature.123 Because evolutionary
biologists stress that competition among individuals is essential to the process of natural
selection, many believe that individuals “have no natural moral tendency to extended altruism”
beyond their close kin,124 with every instance of altruistic behavior being just a disguised form
of self‐interest. While we are an intensely social species that seeks company and inclusion, our
biology predisposes us to intimate groups of usually no more, and often fewer, than 150
individuals. Our evolved sociable and altruistic tendencies seem to flourish best in small
communities of kin‐related individuals, a relic of our hunter‐gatherer history, and wane in more
diffused and distant relationships among strangers. Yet much environmental governance,
especially at an international level, requires high levels of social cooperation in the latter
situation. Addressing climate change and managing ocean fisheries are two pressing
examples.125
118
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While a competitive instinct can be harnessed as a powerful motivation to find solutions to
some environmental problems, for example, by stimulating technological and entrepreneurial
innovations in the market‐place, the propensity of people to splinter into competing groups has
left us with minds prone to adopt prejudices, feud violently, and pursue selfish ends at the
expense of everyone’s long‐term interests. For Murray Bookchin, the human domination and
exploitation of nature is largely a consequence of how we tend to treat one another.126 It is
thus not surprising that the so‐called “deep ecologists” often stress the importance of
developing egalitarian and cooperative means of environmental decision making.127
Another environmentally‐relevant behavioral disposition relates to how people value the
future. It is sometimes said that one of the most foremost attributes of human beings, which
makes us unique among species, is that “humans alone are capable of recognizing the threat
posed by their own natural propensities”.128 Seemingly, we can anticipate and plan for a better
future. Environmental law itself is one manifestation of this tendency, evident by the
precautionary principle which informs many standards and procedures, such as environmental
impact assessment and land use planning, that encourage cautious decision making.129
Examples of this tendency in other spheres of modern life include investment schemes such as
pension plans which help ensure that one does not retire destitute, and insurance markets
which enable individuals to hedge against the risk of costly accidents and misfortune.
Yet, in many other situations people evidently act as though there is no tomorrow. Despite
unprecedented advances in environmental science in recent decades, humankind often acts
obliviously to its lessons. Partly, this is due to the more diffused nature of many contemporary
environmental problems, such as climate change, which are difficult to grasp conceptually.
Thus, as Rolf Lidskog puts it, “these threats are becoming more remote from our perceptual
apparatus and acquiring form as abstract prognoses that are beyond lay people’s knowledge
and experience”.130 Most societies worldwide have shown themselves to be not particularly
proactive in dealing with environmental problems of a long‐term nature. Instead, the gravity of
any threats is denied or trivialized until they materialize to the point of demonstrably
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interfering with our self‐interest, such as when they engender diseases, droughts, and other
impacts that overtly harm personal health or economic prosperity.
Behavioral economics research also shows that people tend not to apply rationally appropriate
“discount rates” when evaluating the future. We often rely on ridiculously high discount rates,
thus weighing present costs and benefits too highly in comparison to future costs and
benefits.131 The tendency to discount the future heavily might once have been a rational bias
for people in ancestral environments, but under today’s conditions it is inappropriate. Such
conditions include that people on average live much longer lives—the emergence of a more
reliable future which enables people to reap the benefits of deferred gratification—and
economic mechanisms such as currencies and pensions which enable future wealth to be
conveniently stored.132 But our lingering propensity to discount the future can exacerbate our
lame reaction to some environmental problems, such as discouraging pollution abatement
despite the high long‐term advantages of acting now on our prescience, and failing to intervene
to protect threatened species until they become critically endangered.133
By the same mismatching process, people tend not to have evolved the requisite fears of some
environmental dangers to themselves and posterity. We have an intensely evolved fear of
spiders, snakes, sharks, and tigers,134 as well as a fear of heights and darkness,135 but seemingly
lack a similar instinctive wariness about pollution and other insidious environmental threats
posed by modern life. Some scientists explain that irrational behavior, such as burning fossil
fuels in the face of catastrophic climate change, is rooted in a universal human tendency of
denial or self‐deception.136 Living in denial of known environmental threats and impacts allows
people to indulge in profligacy without being bothered by the need to take responsibility for
nature’s well‐being. Such self‐deceiving attitudes are evident even with regard to much more
overt risks, such as living in areas prone to natural disasters137 or reckless investments in
speculative markets.138
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These attitudes are related to a cognate tendency to having an overly confident view of human
progress. Current research in the field of psychology suggests strongly that people are often
overly‐optimistic.139 For example, individuals tend to have unrealistically positive images of
themselves, particularly when comparing themselves to others, which is described in the
literature as the “better‐than‐average” effect.140 Being unrealistically optimistic however can
lead individuals to make inaccurate and sometimes costly predictions.141 This cognitive bias in
risk perception is not only due to a failure to appreciate the nature of specific harms, but also
because we can fail to interpret the magnitude of risk. This problem apparently owes to how
risk information is sometimes presented. For instance, many people have been found not to
appreciate that a 0.5 risk of an accident is more hazardous than an activity in which 4 out of 10
people, or 40 percent, of actors will be hurt.142 Such cognitive biases resulting from how risk
information is presented could presumably also affect the design of environmental laws
designed to manage pollution and other toxic risks.
As for what evolutionary purpose could be served by how we misperceive risks and situations,
Robert Trivers, an American evolutionary biologist, suggests “that there are intrinsic benefits to
having … a more optimistic view of the future than the facts would seem to justify”.143 As
Edward O. Wilson explains, this is probably because “[w]ithout it the mind, imprisoned by
fatalism, would slow and deteriorate”.144 Having a pessimistic outlook on life would in
evolutionary terms lead people to forego opportunities because of a fear of failure. Taking risks,
in other words, can be biologically adaptive.
Unfortunately, while some illusions about future prospects might have once been an
evolutionary advantage, presently they are problematic for humankind. Pratarelli and Aragon
surmise that perhaps only “environmental pressures in the form of imminent catastrophic
ecological and/or economic collapse on a scale not seen in recorded human history are likely to
and‐Events/News/2009/Brendan_ McSweeney_Financial_Asset_Market_Failure.pdf (last visited August 28,
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compel humans to adapt their value systems to focus on conservation practices and sustainable
economic policies”.145 Crises sometimes can trigger major structural reform, such as when the
Great Depression of the 1930s motivated sweeping economic policy changes in many countries.
The problem is that most environmental problems and threats, such as climate change, are
catastrophes in relative slow motion; although in geological time their emergence and impact
can be exceptionally rapid, they remain perceptibly rather long‐term for humankind. Only
episodic natural disasters seem to be able to sometimes trigger more immediate responses.
Stephen Boyden, an Australian biohistorian, concludes that these evolved propensities to fear
ancestral dangers but not modern perils, as well as other psychological environmental
maladaptions, are a result of the widening dissonance between humans’ slow biological
evolution and rapid cultural advance.146 Essentially, an ancient instinctive drive to acquire and
consume resources for survival—an “inherent and essential element of all biological systems
operating under natural selection pressures”147—has become a maladaptive tendency for a
species that now numbers nearly seven billion and is equipped with dangerous technologies.148
Boyden labels these mismatching tendencies as “eco‐deviation”.149
Is humankind therefore doomed by its evolutionary inheritance to mindlessly destroy its
environment and thus itself? And, if so, what purpose could environmental law serve other
than to forestall our day of reckoning? While human history since the Holocene began has
generally been accompanied by significant environmental degradation, the evolutionary
sciences also suggest that people have traits that could be harnessed to help shape a more
sustainable future. We are not behaviorally one‐dimensional and human evolutionary success
also owes to our capacity for compassion, conscience, and cooperation. There are also
substantial reasons to protect nature for our own survival and prosperity. The next Part
examines this perspective in order to understand the opportunities for building a more
effective system of environmental law.
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IV. REDESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. CHANGING HUMAN ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR
In order to avoid further environmental degradation, humanity will need more than cleaner
technologies and less wasteful methods of using energy and other natural resources. Already
we have at our disposal a plethora of technologies and solutions that could enable us to reduce
considerably our ecological foot‐print with only modest effort.150 Opinion polls over the years
also show that a substantial majority of persons surveyed declare to be concerned about the
environment.151 Yet, a vast chasm between rhetoric and action often persists.152 While minor
behavioral changes have occurred in response to environmental pressures (e.g., gasoline price
hikes can curb driving habits and increase demand for more fuel‐efficient cars), these changes
have tended to be too fleeting, superficial, or localized in making a difference.153
Given the bleak environmental prognosis and necessity to act urgently, human behavioral
changes must arise culturally rather than by any biological process.154 In a sense, a rapid
150
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mutation in cultural evolution must occur to trigger much more environmentally responsible
attitudes and practices. Maladaptive cultural traits, like disadvantageous genetic mutations,
could be “selected out” under congenial circumstances. Indeed, the historical record shows
that some societies have occasionally dramatically shifted their moral sensibility, for example,
through the abolition of slavery,155 the rise of the animal welfare movement156 and, most
recently, the greatly improved status of women in some countries.157 Racism and sexism may
certainly continue, even in the most enlightened countries, but they are much less publicly
tolerated. Variations in societies’ cultural trajectories also highlight that behaviorally
humankind is not one‐dimensional; indeed, scientists have even identified small genetic
differences behind some of the world’s diverse cultural memes.158 Societies differ in their
environmental customs and impacts, depending on their technologies, economic systems,
geographical circumstances, and many other variables. The high environmental burden of
Western lifestyles, which has been traced as far back as the Christian‐Judeo scriptures,159 can
be contrasted to those aboriginal communities following frugal and subsistence livelihoods.160
Law can be an important tool for altering human behavior and directing cultural change. The
tensions between the selfish inclinations of individuals and the requirements of group living,
explain Richard Alexander, have fostered the development of moral systems that manifest
adulthood—is unusual today. But it was universal among humans before a genetic mutation about 8,000
years ago. Cochran and Harpending contend that our dynamic social and physical environments (including
massive population increase, urbanization, and the dispersal and migration of people worldwide) are
accelerating genetic mutations roughly 100 times faster than the overall average for the six million years of
our hominoid lineage. Small genetic distinctions can have significant consequences, when you consider that
human beings and chimpanzees share about 98 percent of the same genetic makeup: JONATHAN MARKS,
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themselves in various ways, such as through legal rules and religious scriptures.161 Law is a tool
that helps direct humans to behave in ways they otherwise would not, if left to their own
devices. It works to modify aspects of the human environment in order to modify human
behavior. But at the same time, long‐standing scholarly debates about whether law leads or
lags social change suggest that the law cannot rely on methods or goals that are fundamentally
at odds with human nature if it is to be behaviorally effective.162 Both genetic dispositions and
cultural learning shape human behaviour, and having more accurate behavioral models that
incorporate understanding of such factors can improve the law’s effectiveness.
With respect to social cooperation, law has often assumed a Hobbesian model of human
interaction, in which legal intervention is considered to be indispensable for cooperation to
flourish.163 The insights of evolutionary theory discussed in this article cast doubt on this
assumption. Social cooperation is an indelible attribute of the human condition. While
evolutionary psychology helps to explain the persistence of norms that evolved in ancient small
group settings to modern large‐scale society, by predicting that behavioural adaptations to
ancestral environments will be “sticky” relative to changes in the social environment, many of
our evolved instincts also leave us unsuited for modern life. These instincts must thus be
suppressed or controlled by law and other institutions in order to promote economic prosperity
and social welfare. The legal system can thus extend the sphere of cooperation for humans
than would otherwise be naturally attainable. Law can promote cooperation both by enacting
rules that direct human behavior towards specific policy goals and by creating organizations
such as corporations or states that provide decision‐making regimes for coordinating and
managing human activities. For example, corporations, as artificial legal personalities, have
profoundly shaped human economic activity including exploitation of nature for over two
centuries.164 Human behavior in modern societies is thus not unleashed in some raw and
unadulterated form, but, rather, is modulated through institutional and organizational settings
which can stimulate and direct individuals’ behavior in myriad ways.
Modern environmental law in Western countries has nearly half a century of experience in
regulating natural resources exploitation, controlling pollution emissions, protecting
biodiversity, and many other purposes. But its relative lack of success warrants new principles
and methods. Environmental laws that are ineffective—because they are inattentive to the
behavioral drivers of the actors they seek to influence—should be amended or repealed. Some
of our most sophisticated legal mechanisms rest upon fictional and erroneous assumptions
161
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about human behavior. Concurrently, modern environmental law is increasingly blinded by
ideological palliatives such as “sustainable development” that help us rationalize our continuing
encroachments upon the planet.165 Better principles to guide the redesign of our environmental
decrees and standards are necessary. We need to understand the degree to which humans
carry various behavioral predispositions, and thereby to determine which institutions and
regulations can suppress, modify, or channel these predilections toward environmentally
sustainable behavior.
The challenge of making such regulation more behaviorally effective is also generating
pertinent research from other academic disciplines including social psychology and behavioral
economics. Canadian scholar Robert Gifford argues that climate change policy‐makers should
pay more attention to the psychology of individuals in finding ways to motivate change—for
instance, by framing messages in positive terms, such that you can be part of a heroic vanguard
of change, rather than by preaching to people to make costly sacrifices.166 Among behavioral
economists, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue that individuals’ choices are subtly
influenced by the setting in which they make decisions, so that people rarely make “free”
choices in an unadulterated milieu.167 The authors suggest that government policy‐makers can
paternalistically “nudge” individuals to make behavioral changes by simply rearranging that
“choice architecture” without dictating or prescribing change. For example, more people are
likely to comply with a practice voluntarily if they must actively opt‐out of the practice rather
than be asked to opt‐in.
These and other insights are important in exposing the limitations of environmental regulation
and how it might be reformed. To give one common example of environmental law’s failings,
pollution control legislation depends upon toxic substances or pollutants being released into
the environment consistently with the product labeling or emission license approved by the
regulator.168 Such regimes rely, in turn, upon meticulous adherence to a chain of controls,
beginning with policy‐makers setting environmental standards in accordance with robust
scientific research into the effects of releases, efficient transmission of standards by regulators
to polluters, studious attention to operational detail by the polluters, and subsequent diligent
monitoring by enforcement personnel. This concatenation of steps can severely challenge
human psychology. Not surprisingly, empirical research confirms that the improbable
behavioral expectations of such pollution laws often do not occur, with environmental damage
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resulting.169 Moreover, modern pollution regulations do not appear to be strongly facilitated by
the civilizing influences of kinship, reciprocity, reputation, or other factors identified by the
evolutionary theories of altruism. In most cases, the typical pollution episode creates risks to
others (often non‐humans) that are distant in time and place.
Law‐makers should thus be wary of assuming that their commands alone can engender
unmitigated altruistic behavior for the benefit of strangers or other species, and they should be
smart in harnessing the altruistic and cooperative tendencies associated with kinship,
reciprocity, reputation (which can be influential in a local community), and commitment or
passion (which needs some proximity between people). While individuals in close communities
have been shown to be able to solve problems of natural resource management by
spontaneous mechanisms of ordering without the necessity of formal legal rules,170 strong
evidence is lacking that humankind has an intrinsic conservation ethic to support environmental
decision making in other contexts without the regulatory function of law.171 Environmental
policies such as mitigating climate change or conserving biological diversity, which rely on only
generalized and diffuse group benefits, risk failure. While (environmental) moralizing is
certainly part of our evolved human character, obeying our call to be good is evidently not a
particularly strong instinct.
The following sections sketch some principles to help reinvigorate environmental law around
the world. The focus is on some basic concepts that can guide the transformation of
environmental law, rather than attempting to unrealistically elaborate any grandiose blue‐
prints for change.

B. PROXIMITY
Because of the difficulties humankind faces in cooperating at a large scale, and because
globalization allows human civilization to lose sight of local environmental constraints,
environmental law‐makers should invocate what I label the “proximity principle”. It requires
that people should rely as much as possible on local environments to meet their needs and to
dispose of their wastes. Thus, toxic waste should not be shipped thousands of miles to distant
169
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developing countries for cheap disposal, and consumer goods and services should be provided
by local businesses from local materials. One example of this imperative already in place is the
slow food movement, which cajoles people to eat organic food produced locally within 100
miles of their homes.172 It is dubious to call someone an “organic” consumer who lives in
London or New York but consumes a New Zealand apple grown without pesticides that is air
freighted a vast distance to their local supermarket.
By putting our senses in proximity to our environmental burden, we are more likely to trigger
the kind of deep‐seated evolutionary, cognitive and emotional responses that fuel empathy and
compassion for other species and nature generally. This is why animal liberationists and some
environmental groups try to sensitize the consciousness of people by parading barbarous
images of factory farm animals suffering or whales being harpooned, in the hope that we will
see the connections between what we eat (or which law‐makers we vote for), and the resulting
harm.173 While empathy is an emotional reflex, having pity may give us a natural foundation for
moral virtue and legal sanctions.
While the proximity principle is not yet widely recognized in environmental law, it is most
evidently reflected in European Union (EU) law. The approach is implicit in the guiding norms
laid down by the EU Treaty for environmental action.174 Historically, the notion of the proximity
principle has been most closely linked to pollution control and regulation of waste disposal, and
is reflected in a number of EU directives.175 It serves to promote local self‐sufficiency in
environmental management and ensure equity by discouraging communities from exporting
their waste or other environmental impacts to more vulnerable localities.
To implement the proximity principle more comprehensively, there should also be tighter
constraints on international trade including incorporation of more stringent environmental
criteria into trade agreements. However, international exchanges of ideas and innovations,
such as eco‐efficiency technologies, should be encouraged to help societies find solutions to the
common problems they confront. Matt Ridley argues that trade and exchange have been
crucial to the evolutionary success of human beings: “exchange plays the same role in cultural
evolution that sex plays in biological evolution. Sex brings together genetic innovations made in
different bodies; trade brings together cultural evolutions made in different tribes”.176 But
trade in hard goods and services should be curbed in the interests of promoting local
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environmental self‐sufficiency and accountability, with limited exceptions such as helping the
destitute in developing countries who are suffering tragic circumstances.
Concomitantly, the proximity principle demands policy changes in a wide range of other
environmentally‐relevant contexts. For example, environmental controls should extend to
financial markets. They enable people to invest through mutual funds or pension plans in
economic activities that are undertaken far away, sometimes without investors’ knowledge of
the nature of the developments and their resulting environmental impacts. The movement for
socially responsible investment is starting to challenge this recklessness, but it needs
accompanying legal reforms to exert more influence in the market, such as through lender
liability for environmental damage, mandatory disclosure of the financial institutions’
environmental impacts, and taxation incentives for green investment.177
Some environmental issues that transcend local boundaries will continue to demand regional or
global‐level cooperation, such as to sustainably manage marine fisheries, safeguard globally‐
significant carbon sinks, and address other conduct that yields major global externalities. Local
communities commonly lack the knowledge and resources to tackle such issues, and cannot
easily cooperate to resolve them without higher level decision‐making institutions.
Furthermore, as Jonathan Weiner explains, the political incentive for local action, such as
limiting greenhouse emissions, is hindered when such action would incur local costs for minimal
local benefits.178 The proximity principle is not per se at odds with the need to consider the
biosphere on a planetary scale; it asks us to think globally while acting locally when addressing
the environmental impacts of our decisions. But the principle itself does not provide answers to
regulation of trans‐border environmental activities and impacts. In light of the lessons from
evolutionary psychology, international environmental regulation is most likely to flourish when
it goes beyond merely stating rules of behavior to establish institutional regimes that foster
dialogue, mutual understanding, trust, and reciprocity. Oran Young’s work on the design
international regimes for environmental governance offers among the most perspicacious
insights for achieving such arrangements for higher scale cooperation.179

C. REGIME DIVERSITY
The principle of regime diversity is another seminal building‐block for effective environmental
governance. The term regime diversity can be defined as the web of governance arrangements
177

BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT LAW: REGULATING THE UNSEEN
POLLUTERS 533‐40, 559‐67 (2008).

178

Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PENN. L. REV.
1961, 1966‐67 (2007).

179

ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1989).

2011]

A Damp Squib

35

including legal regulation deployed by a society for addressing its environmental challenges.
Such diversity on an international scale provides valuable insurance for overcoming complex
and dynamic environmental problems. As already discussed in this article, the human condition
is not monolithic—there is considerable diversity of behavior among individuals within a given
society, as well as broader cultural diversity among different societies. Just as genetic and
biological diversity improves the resilience of a species or an ecosystem, behavioral and cultural
diversity strengthens the resilience of humankind to meet its problems including the challenge
of developing sustainably.
Cultural diversity can manifest in different approaches to environmental governance, including
in choice of laws, institutions, and practices. Such regime diversity can give humankind more
options to finding answers to its environmental problems. It allows for experimentation with
various approaches, and successful solutions can be exported to other societies for adoption.
Many of the seminal advances in modern environmental law, such as the precautionary
principle, emerged as discrete innovations within individual jurisdictions to be later
disseminated around the world.180 Regime diversity also improves humankind’s resilience to
deal with unexpected, adverse changes in social, economic, or environmental conditions that
might hinder progress towards sustainability. Thomas Homer‐Dixon argues that the resilience
of modern civilization to cope with such risks can be strengthened by reducing those social and
economic connectivities that can cause cascading failures through closely inter‐linked societies
and systems.181 For example, the financial crisis of 2008‐2009 became a larger, global event
because of the interconnected financial markets operating in a liberalized, open international
economy.182 So too, the likelihood or impact of many environmental risks can be minimized if
societies can pursue different models of economic development and have different regulatory
approaches, so that failure in one nation or community does not affect all equally. This
conclusion of course does not imply that local environmental mismanagement occurs without
significant trans‐border impacts, as is well known from disasters such as at Chernobyl.183
International environmental cooperation, as outlined in the previous section, retains a vital role
for managing such situations.
One example of how cultural diversity can educate us in alternative approaches to
environmental stewardship is the case of indigenous communities, who are seen by some as a
paragon of sustainable living.184 Richard Nelson writes, “the ethnographic record supports the
180
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existence of a widespread and well‐developed tradition of conservation, land stewardship, and
religiously based environmental ethics among Native Americans … we need to rediscover a
deep, perhaps spiritually based, affiliation with life”.185 Their environmental record,
nonetheless, suggests that not all indigenous peoples display this ideal. The tendency to
sentimentalize them as noble savages living sustainably has been disputed, and William Vickers
counters that the conservation practices of indigenous peoples are not a state of being, but,
rather, a rational response to changing environmental circumstances.186 Apart from the
Pleistocene overkill of mega fauna, as previously mentioned, more recent and contemporary
evidence casts doubt on the sustainability of all indigenous livelihoods.187 Yet, while the lower
environmental burden of indigenous peoples compared to Western societies is probably a
product of fewer numbers and the limitations of their technologies (rather than any innate
ethic of ecological self‐restraint), their lifestyles still can provide valuable lessons for others in
seeking alternative, more environmentally benign livelihoods.
Environmental lawyers, therefore, should seek to strengthen the legal rights of indigenous
peoples and those other groups around the world whose lifestyles are more conducive to
sustainability. In Canada, a world leader in this area, legal initiatives such as acknowledgement
of aboriginal land title, negotiation of comprehensive land claims agreements, and the First
Nations Land Management Act, are among progressive examples of measures to enhance
indigenous self‐determination in environmental governance.188 Through such regimes
indigenous participation and values can be expressed and different approaches to natural
resource management pursued.
This example also illustrates how the principle of regime diversity must often be linked to
strategies for social justice and equality. Communities that are oppressed and marginalized are
unlikely to be able to maintain viable governance traditions and practices. Murray Bookchin has
also linked improvements in social justice to better environmental practices, since societies
wracked by violence and discrimination are unlikely to be particularly attentive to their
environment.189 In a world marked by gross inequalities between developing and developed
countries, the rich and the poor, and racial majorities and minorities, environmental law will
185
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surely struggle to resonate relevance. Environmental law should complement social reforms to
reduce these gaps and inequalities through human rights law, international development
assistance, and other mechanisms for social justice. While the sustainable development
rhetoric of inter‐ and intra‐generational equity suggests that environment policy‐makers are
already well acquainted with this imperative,190 in practice far too many environmental
decisions, ranging from the siting of waste dumps to the management of conservation areas,
marginalize social justice considerations.191
Such reforms would dovetail with some of the lessons of evolutionary psychology. Regime
diversity implies a degree of localism in the governance of environmental issues. This creates
better opportunities for taking advantage of the altruistic and cooperative impulses of human
communities, which are strongest where their members are able to interact frequently and
intimately. Regime diversity also allows for a better matching between the governance systems
and cultural preferences of each society, rather than imposing uniform approaches at odds with
different historical, geographical, and cultural traditions. Combined with the proximity
principle, regime diversity provides a crucial pillar for rebuilding environmental law.

C. CURBING INCREMENTALISM
A third key objective of environmental law must be to curb the incremental environmental
impacts of modern lifestyles. Environmental law does not deal very well with incremental
impacts that cumulatively can be over‐whelming. Traditionally, environmental regulation was
based on an underlying premise that environmental problems are best addressed where they
physically occur and where impacts lie, associated with images of fuming smokestacks, leaking
pipelines, and the like. Yet, many of today’s most urgent environmental problems have
emerged slowly and surreptitiously, through cumulative activities from numerous and highly
dispersed sources, not effectively targeted by existing point‐source regulation.192 These include
climate change, persistent organic pollutants in the food chain, and erosion of biodiversity. For
example, greenhouse gases and ozone‐depleting chemicals are invisible. Causal connection is
difficult as these insidious environmental problems are often widely disconnected by time and
place. Long ecological shadows are also cast by our consumer culture, such as the annual
production of billions of plastic bags and bottles, which may end up seemingly “out‐of‐sight” as
detritus floating in the ocean to be swallowed by marine life, or as waste buried in landfill sites
that eventually contaminate groundwater reservoirs.193 Such incrementalism obscures and
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displaces environmental costs, and makes our personal decisions seem inconsequential to the
planet. This phenomenon also points to a potential blind‐spot of making environmental
decisions on solely the basis of the proximity principle, which tends to focus on those activities
and impacts which are most visible locally.
Our evolved psychology does not allow us to appreciate such incremental impacts very well.
We may understand the message—don’t shop with a plastic bag or recycle that plastic bottle—
but our habits continue largely unchanged. We tend not to feel morally that there is much at
stake in our individual actions. The main triggers for extended altruism are also lacking in such
situations where there are no identifiable beneficiaries. The complex multitude of actors
involved in such pervasive environmental problems also makes it difficult to identify specific
persons or places with which we could “reciprocate” good deeds.
Therefore, environmental policy instruments must do more than target mere end‐of‐pipe
sources. They must also address the underlying processes in the economy that fuel
unsustainable practices. Environmental law so far has sought only in limited ways to challenge
the curse of incrementalism. In many countries, environmental impact assessment procedures
for development projects require proponents to evaluate the projected impacts in light of the
cumulative effects.194 Authorities have also turned to market‐based instruments promising
more flexible and cooperative ways to address environmental threats, such as cap‐and‐trade
schemes to limit pollution emissions or natural resources harvested.195 However, these
instruments tend to work only well in regulating a portion of the market—the big and visible
entities, while the little stuff can remain overlooked.
The challenge, thus, is to build an environmental law diaspora, where environmental standards
are embedded throughout all spheres of social and economic life. This could be achieved for
example through ecological tax reform, which would shift the tax burden from income
generation to consumption activities and thereby more comprehensively could create
disincentives against many incremental demands on the environment.196 Consistent with the
proximity principle, much of this diasporic regulation must also manifest at a local level, for
example, through land use planning laws that curb urban sprawl. Local‐level controls can also
sometimes more efficiently respond to local circumstances and environmental pressures.
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An environmental law diaspora may however be institutionally unsustainable without careful
design. Pervasive state regulation of personal and market activity poses levels of coerciveness
that are likely impracticable and unacceptable to most policymakers, the business sector, and
individuals. Regulatory theorists such as Gunther Teubner warn of the burdens of
“juridification” when regulation becomes too ambitious and meddlesome.197 Social historians
such as Joseph Tainter characterize the problem as one where increasing investments by a
society in “complexity” to solve its problems lead to diminishing returns and policy failures.198
Confronted with mounting environmental stresses, states often prescribe more detailed rules,
devise new technologies and commit greater financial resources. Initially, such investments can
obtain concrete results (as the “low hanging fruit” is picked first) but gradually they yield ever
more meagre results to the point where the remedial costs can become unsustainable to
society. Environmental problems such as climate change and the loss of biodiversity are among
those that require some enormously complex and costly responses.
To address this challenge therefore probably requires both rethinking basic economic models
that shape what we value and what constitutes legitimate development, and embedding
regulatory standards at the very point where economic decision making in business
corporations and financial institutions arises. Ecological economists such as Herman Daly are
leading efforts in this area by advancing proposals for a “steady state economy” and other
solutions for limiting incremental economic growth.199 Presently, environmental law is largely
an imposed “external” set of constraints to economic institutions, rather than an intrinsic
element in their formative decision making. The procedures and processes of economic
decision making should be revamped to embed sustainability considerations from the outset, to
be incorporated into all business decision making. This reorientation could be achieved, for
example, by altering the fiduciary duties of corporations and financial institutions so that they
would prioritize sustainable development, rather than act for the exclusive benefit of their
shareholders, creditors, or other economic beneficiaries.200
The above principles and ideas are by no means exhaustive—they simply illustrate the more
important aspects of a new agenda of environmental law reform to address fundamentally the
maladaptive human condition. Creating more interdisciplinary dialogue is crucial to developing
more comprehensive regulatory strategies for sustainability. We need to build new public
forums, nationally and globally, to explore and debate legal and other solutions to our
environmental challenges. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change for example have been established to investigate the biophysical
aspects of global change, but they hardly look at the ethical, cultural, and psychological
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dimensions of the creation and resolution of these environmental threats.201 The tool‐box of
environmental law must stimulate more interdisciplinary approaches to environmental decision
making, such as using public environmental inquiries. They were used quite successfully in
Australia during the 1990s through the former Resource Assessment Commission,202 and in
Canada in the 1970s, such as the famous Berger inquiry into the proposed Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline.203 If structured properly, public inquiries can provide a seminal means for interaction
and dialogue among people from all walks of life, and the synthesis of different academic
disciplines to consider environmental impacts and development choices. In other words, they
are decision making forums that might best illuminate some of the insights of evolutionary
psychology and other disciplines for understanding human environmental behavior.

V. PARTING THOUGHTS
We must understand the evolutionary basis of our behavior to solve the environmental
problems we created. Our biological makeup influences, but neither justifies nor predetermines
our environmentally harmful lifestyles. Although evolutionary scientists imply that culture is
secondary to biological urges, culture itself is one of the manifestations of the evolution of
Homo sapiens sapiens. Essentially, we are born with an ability to behave in certain ways and
learn certain things. Nature thus circumscribes rather than determines our possibilities.
Humans are genetically wired with certain predispositions, even behavioral, but our intellectual
capacity to rationalize allows us to make choices which can influence outcomes. The
manifestation of our evolved instincts depends on specific environmental contexts, and even
when triggered our evolved adaptations usually give us several possible responses, such as to
fight, freeze, or flee when confronted with a dangerous animal.
Concurrently, we should not trivialize our environmental practices and impacts on the basis of
some crude reasoning that they simply reflect the laws of natural selection and the workings of
nature. Nature is not a moral authority and we shouldn’t necessarily derive our values from its
workings, such as “survival of the fittest” or “might makes right”. We should also be careful
when elevating our own moral agency and responsibility that we don’t lapse into a perspective
of pure cultural relativism without any defensible truths such as regarding the threat of climate
change or mass extinction of species. Anthropologists Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky argue
that concepts of “pollution” and “harm” should be seen as cultural constructs rather than
purely objective realities, whose meaning is dependent on their social context and time.204
201

Paul R. Ehrlich & Donald Kennedy, Millennium Assessment of Human Behavior, 309 SCIENCE 562 (2005).

202

Benjamin J. Richardson & Ben Boer, Contribution of Public Inquiries to Environmental Assessment, 2(2)
AUSTRALIAN J. ENVTL MAN. 90 (1995).

203

THOMAS R. BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND: THE REPORT OF THE MACKENZIE
VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY (1977).

204

MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 36‐38 (1983).

2011]

A Damp Squib

41

Conceivably, from this perspective, a society might even aspire to transform nature into an
artificial dystopia of plastic trees and genetically engineered animals. While evolutionary
psychology alerts us to flaws in how humans sometimes perceive their environmental impacts
and risks, it does not imply that those impacts and risks should be treated as purely value
judgments. We should remain open to dialogue about the contested scientific research behind
many environmental problems and be attentive to cultural biases at work.
By conscious cultural evolution and education, we can act on that environmental knowledge to
devise solutions to the problems we spawned. Our ability to reason abstractly and emotionally
about the impact of our behavior on one another and nature generally gives us unique means
to address those impacts. As a moral animal, we have the capacity to consciously shape the
well‐being of the planet. The “is” and the “ought” of human nature may be logically separable,
but they are not so far removed as to preclude enlightened reform. Acting ethically towards the
environment does not involve an insurmountable struggle with our deepest natures. Biology,
ethology, anthropology, and evolutionary psychology provide information about human nature
that can help make environmental law more behaviorally effective. But twentieth century
history painfully shows that there are limits to the power of culture in changing human nature.
Attempts to remold human nature according to a utopian vision have given rise to such horrors
as Stalin’s totalitarianism and Pol Pot’s genocide.205 The renewal of environmental law should
thus go hand‐in‐hand with democratic and social justice policies.
Humankind’s burdensome relationship with nature poses the greatest challenge in our
evolutionary history. From our own self‐interest as a species, what is at stake is our very future.
In a rather frightening observation, Jared Diamond in the Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee
speculates why we have never encountered intelligent life from other planets.206 He suggests
that all highly intelligent life might face an evolutionary dead‐end, because once a species
evolves the capacity to destroy its environment and itself—such as by nuclear weapons and
other transformative technologies—it is perhaps only a matter of time before by conscious
choice or reckless indifference it does so. The most successful species, believes Diamond, are
not the cleverest but the relatively “dumb and clumsy rats and beetles”.207
If we despairingly conclude that it is too late or impossible to stop the juggernaut of
environmental destruction through our laws and other institutions, we might take solace that
nature should recover in a world without us. If we can’t live in community with nature, at least
nature should live without us. In his best‐seller, The World Without Us, Alan Weisman predicts
that, liberated from humankind's environmentally poisonous burden, the planet would quickly
recover from most of the damage within a few thousand years, and within a few million years
only the most virtually indestructible plastics and radioactive materials would linger on,
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hopefully buried out of harms way.208 The ability of nature to recover quickly from the worst
assaults is already evident; such as around Chernobyl, where animal life has blossomed after
the 1986 deadly radiation leak in an area where few humans still dare to visit.
But hopefully humankind through its environmental laws will be able to live with, rather than
apart from, nature. While human beings have a dark side, as portrayed in Golding’s Lord of the
Flies, our biological and cultural legacy is somewhat more complicated than this story and we
have evolved a benevolent side. In order to overcome the damp squib that modern
environmental law has become, lawyers must nurture our kinder traits before it is too late.
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